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What is macro–prudential policy?
according to the FSB, BIS and IMF
policy that uses primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or
system–wide financial risk, thereby limiting the incidence of
disruptions in the provision of key financial services that can
have serious consequences for the real economy, by
• dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and
building defences that contain the speed and sharpness of
subsequent downswings and their effects on the economy;
• identifying and addressing common exposures, risk
concentrations, linkages and interdependencies that are
sources of contagion and spillover risks that may
jeopardise the functioning of the system as a whole.
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Possible paths
1. Use risk forecasting methods to identify the build up of
risk and implement corrective measures
• Basel II/III is a good example
2. Use supervisory level data to identify vulnerabilities, and
upon that implement corrective measures
3. Use methods to prevent vulnerabilities before they happen
(like LTV, restrictions on capital inflows, etc.)
4. Recognizing that we know little about the nature of
systemic risk or financial instability and focus attention on
study
I will only focus on the first here
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Risk and risk forecasting
• While risk is the probability of something going wrong
• In a financial context, risk forecasting is the application of
formal statistical methods and available data to predict
future probability of things going wrong
• I want to limit myself to a subset of this,
• the most common market risk forecasting methods
• systematic risk forecasting
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Key questions
1. Are fancy methods just based on plain old VaR?
• Is the underlying model reliable?
2. Does every indicator flash at the same time?
3. Is 2007/ 2008 really the right benchmark?
4. Are crises sufficiently similar to be amenable to statistical
analysis?
5. How to evaluate the risk forecasts (taking into account
the intended application)
6. Paralysis by analysis
7. Is the probability appropriate?
8. What is the objective of micro–prudential policy founded
on risk forecasts?
9. Can a formal risk forecast beat the Financial Times?
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Some approaches
• Public data
• Accounting and balance sheet information
• Interbank and other network linkages
• Exposure
• Financial market data
• equity markets
• bonds and CDS
• Private data
• Like supervisory level data
We start with the public
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The ECB list
Deviations of credit-to-GDP ratios and (real) house prices
from trend, credit growth, loan growth and customer deposits;
term and credit spreads, intra-financial credit and credit risk
conditions; equity valuations, stock returns and real equity
growth; bank efficiency scores, contagion effects and leverage;
asset price misalignments related to market sentiment; terms
of trade and current account deficit; and measures of fiscal
vulnerability. Global credit volume and global credit growth,
global GDP growth, global leverage, real equity growth and
equity valuations, as well as commodity prices. The decoupling
of financial firms’ credit risk conditions from the
macroeconomic and financial variables that usually explain
them.
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Does every indicator seems to flash at
the same time?
• Many authors have proposed indicators/predictors for
2007
• The most obvious are CDS spreads and VIX (next slide)
• The question is, do all the indicators/predictors signal at
the same time
• Or can we find one that leads in a statistically significant
sense
• taking into account all the data mining (hindsight bias)
• if you try to 20 variables, one will predict significantly at
5%
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
CDS & VIX
2006 2008 2010 2012
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
cd
s
JPM
BSC
GS
VIX
vi
x
20%
40%
60%
80%
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
CDS & VIX 2007
Mar May Jul Sep Nov
0.005
0.010
0.015
JPM
BSC
GS
VIX
20%
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Is 2007/ 2008 really the right
benchmark?
• We don’t know the nature of the next crisis, but it will be
different from this one
• Excessively calibrating models and analysis to 2007/2008
not advisable
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How to evaluate the risk forecasts
(taking into account the intended application)
• Basel I/II/II.V/III (and surely IV, V, etc.) mandate
backtesting of risk forecasts
• It is only prudent to make the same demand of risk
forecasts used for macro–prudential purposes
• This has to explicitly take into account the low probability
events and the nature of crisis
• A risk forecast without a proper backtest is like religion,
we have to take it on faith
• Finding that method predicts 2007 is not nearly enough
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Paralysis by analysis
my skiing instructor once told me that if once on the top of a mountain,
one rationally analyzes a decision to ski down, one ends up taking the lift
— paralysis by analysis
• Given the fact that there are dozens, hundreds of
potential predictors/indicators for macro prudential policy
makers
• one of them will at any given time flash red
• Therefore, any indicator/predictor needs to be carefully
chosen
• without data mining or hindsight bias
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Is the probability appropriate?
• Basel I/II/III VaR is 99% daily
• 2.5 events per year
• Most proposals use similar probabilities
• But crisis are infrequent (< 1/2500 daily)
• So any 99% daily method says nothing about crises
probabilities, or the buildup of vulnerabilities
• Probability shifting (translating from one probability to
another) does not work
• One could ask what is the point of the 99% daily in Basel
• (I discuss EVT later)
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Are crises sufficiently similar to be
amenable to statistical analysis?
• By a first approximation, we observe roughly one event of
high stock market turmoil per decade
• By a first approximation, individual countries observe one
crisis per generation
• These tend not to be very similar
• Therefore, it is hard to the point of impossible to rely on
statistical analysis of past crises for what might happen in
future crises
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What is the exact objective of
micro–prudential policy founded on risk
forecasts?
• Understand the vulnerabilities in the system
• Smooth the road
• Prevent crises altogether
• Prevent crises that exceed certain severity threshold
• Which leaves the question, is the objective desirable and
achievable?
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Basic problem
• Supposedly a successful in smoothing out the cycles ( at
least the most extreme shocks)
• That increases appetite for risk
• And endogenously increases risk taking
• Thereby undermining the smoothness success
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Forest fires in the US
• Forest fires are endemic in the Southwest US
• Historically, they would flare every few years, burn the
undergrowth, but spare the big trees
• Fires were frequent and small
• Then people moved into forests — all fires fought
• Successful for a generation
• Then when a fire starts, there is so much dry undergrowth
that fire becomes out of control and burns the big trees
• The US fire authorities opted for what was in effect
lowering volatility and fattening the tails
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Macro prudential policy founded
on extant market risk
methodologies
some might say they failed
before the crisis, but...
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Systemic risk from market risk models
• Ri is risky outcomes of institution i
• RS is outcomes from the entire financial system
• Joint distribution is:
f (Ri ,RS)
• Marginal density is f (Ri), and the two conditional
densities are f (Ri |RS) and f (RS |Ri)
• VaR, (where Q is a quantile)
pr[Ri ≤ Qi ] = p
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Common measures
these things are much more similar than often maintained
Marginal
risk
measure Condition on system Condition on institution
MVaR CoVaR
VaR pr[Ri ≤ Qi |RS ≤ QS ] = p pr[RS ≤ QS |Ri ≤ Qi ] = p
MES CoES
ES E[Ri |RS ≤ QS ] E[RS |Ri ≤ Qi ]
• Other measures like Shapley fit into this
• All depend on daily VaR and have more model risk than
VaR
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Experiment
From one of my papers “Model Risk of Systemic Risk Models”
• Daily total returns January 1997–December 2010
• 92 largest US financial institutions
• 99% daily VaR with the most widely used
state–of–the–art methods
• HS, MW, student-t MW, EWMA, GARCH and student-t
GARCH
• Range of estimation windows (500, 1000, 1500)
• $1000 portfolio
• End of quarter results
• Probability is 1%
• The easiest risk forecast scenario possible
• If this looks bad, surely everything else will be worse
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Q4 2002
Bank max VaR
min VaR
Method at min Method at max
BK 2.22 MA t–GARCH
JPM 1.43 MA t–GARCH
STT 1.57 GARCH t–MA
USB 1.66 EWMA t–GARCH
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Ratio of highest to lowest
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
BK
JPM
STT
USB
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Ratio of highest to lowest
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2
4
6
8
10
12
BK
JPM
STT
USB
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
JP Morgan highest and lowest VaR
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Results
• Best case scenario
• Only model risk, not parameter risk
• No multivariate issues clouding the results
• With 3 different industry–standard estimation
methodologies can make
VaR=$25 or VaR=$60 or VaR=$160
• We can make VaR be anything
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More realistically
The problem gets worse with
• Aggregation
• Smaller markets
• Manipulation
• More model driven pricing
• More mechanistic application of models
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Two explanations
1. Failure to comply with the underlying statistical
assumptions
• I am not the only who is non–compliant, nobody is
2. Endogenous risk
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Statistical assumptions
Most risk models are based on snapshot measurements
(maybe sequence of daily observations)
1. One stochastic model covering all states of the world
2. Modeller has never seen data, and runs model once
3. Backtester
• has never seen data
• is fully independent of modeller
• does not provide any feedback to model design
and these are like always obeyed
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Snooping
• If we know what data looks like
• (e.g. how a model performs in back testing)
• We will cheat (unless a saint, and even then)
• It is inevitable that modellers know the data
• And inevitable that this will bias their analysis
• This means that the actual confidence bounds on risk
model outputs are much larger than indicated
• (in the few cases anybody pays attention to confidence)
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Backtesting
• Statistically analyze violations of risk forecasts
• occurrence, clustering, magnitude, ...
• Bernoulli hit sequences
• Small sample problems
• Very hard to identify clustering
• Very hard to analyze magnitudes
• Whilst at the same time the backtester is not the person
who designed the model and does not feed back to the
model design
Backtesting is unreliable
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Three states of the world: JPM
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Structural break modelling
• Most models use a single stochastic process to capture all
states of the world
• And hence miss the structural breaks (like in JPM)
• Models generally do not entertain structural breaks
• Because it is almost impossible to do so
• (yes I know Markov switching, and no, it doesn’t work
here)
• the uncertainty around the magnitude and location of the
switching point is too high
• So we have to assume that the JPM regimes are really one
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Immediate conclusion
• State–of–the–art market risk models are highly inaccurate
• Just by tweaking the model I can make VaR be $100,
$200 or $300, using only models accepted by the
supervisors
• Model risk much higher during extreme turmoil
• Model risk much higher at systematically important
probabilities
• To me this suggests market risk approaches are not all
that reliable for macroprudential purposes
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Nature of risk
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Endogenous risks vs. Exogenous risks
• Endogenous risk: the risk from shocks that are generated
and amplified within the system
• Exogenous risk: shocks that arrive from outside the
system
• Analogies
• A financial hedge (futures contract) vs. a weather hedge
(umbrella)
• Poker vs. Roulette
• Essentially situations where an agent affects outcomes
vs.
situations where the agent cannot
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Assumptions behind almost every risk
and pricing model known
• Risk is exogenous (we are strictly price takers)
• Market prices are the best reflection of value
• Today’s price has most information
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If true, consequently
• The best way to forecast risk (even prices) is to combine
a historical sample of prices
• With a model like EWMA, HS, IV, etc. . . .
• Best to down weigh history
• Price dynamics in a crisis belong to the same stochastic
process as price dynamics outside of crisis
and VaR works great
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However . . .
• Risk is really endogenous
• Prices reflect constraints (margins, capital, politics, etc.)
• These effects are stronger during crises
• Forces driving prices and risk are different in a crisis than
out of crisis
• The underlying economic process may be the same, but
we are talking statistics
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Risk in crises
The monster gets quietly stronger under the bed
• Estimating a model on non–crisis data is unlikely to say
very much about risk during times of stress
• Very little data available
• Risk building up in quiet times
We can not get from the failure process in normal times to the
failure process in crisis times
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Minsky
• Minsky (1992) argued that economies have either stable
or unstable financial regimes. Even if the economy starts
out stable, continued prosperity paves the way for an
unstable system
• Stability is destabilizing because financial institutions
have a tendency to extrapolate stability into infinity,
investing in ever more risky debt structures, followed an
abrupt correction
• Like before 2007s when all were blind to the hidden risk
during the “great moderation”
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When risk is created
Former head of the BIS, Andrew Crockett in 2000
“The received wisdom is that risk increases in recessions and
falls in booms. In contrast, it may be more helpful to think of
risk as increasing during upswings, as financial imbalances
build up, and materialising in recessions.”
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Actual and perceived risk
• The monster under the bed is actual risk
• Perceived risk is what the models tell us
• These two tend to be negatively correlated
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Endogenous bubble
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Dual role of prices
• They are a passive reflection of the underlying economic
fundamentals, an aggregation of all available information
but on the other
• Also an imperative to action
• Implications (see next slide)
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Role of prices
• Market prices during periods of calm are a poor input into
forecast models
• They are not informative about the distribution of prices
that follow after a crisis is triggered
• Price dynamics during one crisis may be quite different in
the next, limiting the ability to draw inference from crisis
events
Risk models underestimate risk during calm times and
overestimate risk during crisis — they get it wrong in all states
of the world
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Systemic risk forecasting
• Market variables as indication of the risk of future
systemic event
• Systemic risk is concerned with events that happen during
crisis conditions, looking far into the tails of distributions
• Little relevant data
• Over the last fifty or so years we have observed less than
a dozen episodes of extreme international market
turmoil, all unique
• Models that are fed with inputs from calm periods will
perform much less well during periods of stress
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What about tail methods
like extreme value theory (EVT)
• They are fundamentally based on a constant stochastic
process
• The only way EVT can be reliable in this application is if
• Financial crisis are regular (and similar) events that can
be modeled
• However, they are infrequent and unique
• Therefore, I don’t think tail methods are much use in this
case
Introduction Risk models Nature of risk Quality control Conclusion
Quality control
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Quality control for systemic risk
measures
1. Point forecasts are not sufficient: need confidence
intervals incorporating both estimation risk and model risk
2. Data should be predictive and not reactive
3. Statistical method needs to include backtesting
4. Event probabilities need to correspond with the
probability of systemic events
• If such events happen once every 10 years, 99%
probabilities (2.5 times a year) are of little relevance
• One can not map failure probabilities from less extreme
to more extreme. (estimate at 99% use for 99.9%)
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Is a bad systemic risk measure better
than none?
• Current systemic risk measures are quite bad, perhaps
indistinguishable from random noise or at best weakly
better in prediction
• High cost of using an incorrect method
• A bad systemic risk measure should not be acceptable for
policy purposes, it should be of a proven quality
• Type 2 errors are very costly (falsely finding high sysrisk)
• Avoid the fallacy of requiring a number for
decision–making regardless of the number quality
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Private data
Supervisory level data
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Problem with public market data
• It reflects expectations
• And this suggests every indicator flashes at the same time
• It however only reacts to perceived and not actual risk
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Supervisory data
• Supervisory data is not affected by this problem as much
• And therefore might be used to develop reliable systemic
risk indicators/predictors
• For example exposure data with named counterparties
• Can help with network models
• Or data on chances in trading activities
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Stress tests for individual institutions
• I don’t think stress tests applied to individual banks are
very informative about systemic risk
1. Impossible to assign probabilities to stress events and
there there is an infinite number of potential stress events
2. Endogenous risk
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Industry stress tests
• Individual banks are not hit by stress and isolation
• They will react by trading into a general distressed
environment
• Therefore interaction between banks matter
• This means that we would need that industrywide stress
test
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Does Risk Forecasting Help
Macroprudential Policy Makers?
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Does Risk Forecasting Help
Macroprudential Policy Makers?
Not really
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Origins of methods
• While many techniques are fancily dressed up
• Underneath is usually a standard market risk model
• These did not cover themselves in glory prior to 2007
• And the macro prudential problem expects more of these
methods than most internal applications in banks
• Meanwhile, the quality control in the macro prudential
space is lower than in the market risk space
• Therefore, I don’t think such approaches can be of much
use
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Why
• The underlying models are highly unreliable
• Very hard to model actual risk
• Mistakes are very costly
• Type 1
• Type 2
